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ANIMAL CRUELTY LAWS: THE CASE FOR REFORM
Charles E. Friend*
Laws, and the enforcement or observance of laws, for the protection
of dumb brutes from cruelty, are, in my judgement, among the best
evidences of the justice and benevolence of men.
-Arnold, J.'
If, as Justice Arnold suggests in the foregoing quotation, our ani-
mal protection laws are indicative of the level to which "the justice
and benevolence of men" has risen, then truly the human race is in
sad shape. An examination of the history of the subject clearly
reveals that man's inhumanity to man is exceeded only by man's
inhumanity to animals. The popular image of animal existence fos-
tered by innumerable Walt Disney movies and a plethora of chil-
dren's books is so far removed from reality that it borders on the
fraudulent. The fact is that neglect, torture and destruction of help-
less and usually inoffensive animals is so widespread and chronic in
both history and contemporary society that one is tempted to con-
clude that cruelty to animals is a basic human instinct, only lightly
obscured by a veneer of hypocritical platitudes and an occasional
"Be Kind to Animals Week."
Until the very recent past the law and the legal profession took
little cognizance of the problem. What few laws existed prior to the
mid-nineteenth century were primarily directed toward protecting
the owners of animals, rather than the animals themselves, and
anti-cruelty statutes per se were virtually unknown.
The primary reason for this legal vacuum was the common law
view that all animals were property belonging absolutely to the
human owner and therefore subject to his slightest whim. They
could be exploited, used, abused, or dispatched at his pleasure.
Cruelty to animals was simply not an offense. The owner of the
property could torture, starve, or kill his "property" without ac-
counting to anyone, and, of course, cruelty to ownerless animals
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond. B.A. George Washington University
1957, J.D. William and Mary 1969.
1. Stephens v. State, 65 Miss. 329, 3 So. 458 (1888).
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violated no law because no property rights were invaded. 2 Dogs were
held in particularly low regard, in some cases being entitled to even
less protection than other domestic animals.' Thus, at common law,
dogs were not the subject of larceny,4 and no indictment would lie
for killing a dog.5 This concept of the animal as personal property,
equivalent in status to a shovel, a chair, or a pair of shoes is still
reflected in state statutes and case law.'
Superimposed on this historical concept of the animal as a chattel
are several nonlegal factors which have contributed to and pro-
longed our national disinterest in animal welfare. We are all famil-
iar, for example, with the callous lack of concern for other living
creatures, animal or otherwise, which characterizes the majority of
the human race, and with the deep public apathy which is encoun-
tered in dealing with most of the world's social ills. Added to this
attitude are the very substantial economic factors which arise from
the profitability of breeding, selling, trapping, slaughtering, keep-
ing, shearing, plucking, skinning, hunting, harnessing, riding, and
eating animals; the lack of adequate enforcement of what laws there
are; and, perhaps most reprehensible, the reluctance of politicians
to support any new law which might possibly offend any voting
breeder, seller, trapper, slaughterer, keeper, shearer, plucker, skin-
ner, hunter, harnesser, rider or eater of animals.
Despi4 -2 the legislative inertia created by the sum total of these
factors, some progress has been made. On all levels-federal, state,
and local-laws have been passed which, in principle at least, pur-
port to rectify some of the more flagrant abuses, and more than one
courageous legislator has risked the ire of powerful lobbies to vote
for protective legislation.
The purpose of this article is to survey the legislation and, to a
certain extent, the case law, as it exists today in the United States,
2. Malicious mischief statutes were applicable, but these emphasized the injury to the
"property" of the animal's owner. They were not concerned with the suffering of the animal,
and a conviction could be obtained only upon a showing of malice toward the owner of animal.
Obviously, such a statute could come into play only in the case of an injury to an owned
animal by one other than the owner. Convictions were rare.
3. Commonwealth v. Maclin, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 877 (1831).
4. Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 638, 112 S.E. 622 (1922).
5. Davis v. Commonwealth 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 617 (1867). This has generally been altered
by statutes. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 29-193 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
6. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 29-193 (Cum. Supp. 1973) (dogs as personal property).
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to identify those areas where steps have been taken to illuminate
-some of the problems which remain, and to suggest possible meth-
ods of improvement. To this end, state law will be emphasized, with
due acknowledgement of the growing federal concern with some of
these areas, and with passing reference to municipal and county
ordinances in the field.
I. STATE ANTI-CRUELTY LAWS
A dog owned by . . .a neighbor of the appellants, wandered and
strayed over to a farm owned by the appellants' parents . . . . [a]p-
pelants. . . decided that they would take the dog. . . to a crossroad
. . .so that he would not return to the farm. . . .[a]ppellants tied
a tin can to his tail and filled the can with stones. . . .A rope was
found in the rear of the automobile and the appellants tied the dog
to the right side of the rear bumper. . . .Appellants testified that
the maximum speed the car was driven was from 10 to 15 miles per
hour. On three separate occasions [one of the appellants] looked out
to see the dog, and the first and second time . . . the dog was getting
along fine; but. . the third time he looked at the dog, he was down
and dragging. . . . The dog had been dragged for some dist-
ance-approximately over a fifteen acre tract of land. . . .[They]
cut the rope and placed the dog in a ditch alongside the highway.
There was ample evidence. . that a trail of blood was traceable for
six-tenths of a mile in the road to the place where the dog was ulti-
mately found.
The offence was committed by appellants on a Thursday afternoon,
and the dog was not found until the following Sunday afternoon. He
was found [still alive] by a neighbor. . . .The neighbor who testi-
fied that he. . . took the dog to a veterinarian. . . who in testifying,
described the dog's condition as follows:
"* **The front leg as I remember and the sternum . . .was
completely denuded of muscle and the tendons were rotted. The
back leg. . . was also completely denuded and the bones were
exposed. It was quite offensive, and the flies had gotten in there
• . .and it was full of maggots .... [t]he next morning the
dog was dead.**"7
Behavior of the type described in the foregoing quotation would
not even have been a punishable offense at common law, except to
7. State v. Surma, 263 Wis. 388, 389-91, 57 N.W.2d 370, 371-72 (1953).
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the extent that some property interest was invaded. The suffering
which this unfortunate animal felt would have been, in the eyes of
the law, irrelevant.
However, the awakening of the modem social conscience which
has so deeply affected other areas of the law has also manifested
itself in an altered legal view of the nature and status of animals.
Increasingly, there is recognition by legislatures and courts that
"animals have rights which, like those of human beings, are to be
protected.""
As a result of this belated pricking of conscience, the various
states and localities have begun to enact statutes and ordinances
which alter the common law pattern, at least to the extent of at-
tempting to set some limits to the suffering which may be inflicted
upon animals, regardless of ownership. All American state jurisdic-
tions now have some form of anti-cruelty statute which purports to
make abuse of animals (however defined) a criminal offense, and
these statutes are generally construed to apply to one's own animals,
as well as those of other owners, unknown owners, or no owners.9
A. Animals Protected
When contemplating a prosecution under modem anti-cruelty
laws, it is first necessary to determine if the victim in the case is in
fact covered by the laws. In most cases, the statute refers in terms
to "any animal."'" Such statutes are generally construed or ex-
pressly stated to include any living creature other than man unless
a contrary legislative intent is suggested." Some statutes may, how-
ever, be limited by express language or court construction to certain
classes of animals, e.g., domestic animals or "useful" animals,'"
thereby excluding large segments of the animal population from
protection. This latter phenomenon is, of course, another remnant
of the property concept, the reasoning apparently being that only a
valuable animal is capable of screaming in agony.
8. State v. Karstendiek, 49 La. Ann. 1621, 1624, 22 So. 845, 847 (1897).
9. See, e.g., State v. Bruner, 111 Ind. 98, 12 N.E. 103 (1887).
10. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 59 (Cum. Supp. 1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-216 (Cum.
Supp. 1973); RICHMOND, VA., CODE § 5-4 (1968).
11. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-360 (Repl. Vol. 1969), which provides that "animal...
shall be held to include every living creature .. "; and VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-225 (Repl.
Vol. 1960), which provides that "animal" shall include "birds and fowl."
12. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-19 (1966) ("... any horse or other domestic animal.
[Vol. 8:201
ANIMAL CRUELTY LAWS
B. General Anti-Cruelty Statutes
It appears that every state has now passed some form of general
anti-cruelty statute, prohibiting in broad terms "unnecessary" cru-
elty in any form to any animal or a specified class of animals, re-
gardless of ownership. Over the years, as a result of court interpreta-
tions and a general urge toward uniformity, the statutes have taken
on a remarkable similarity in language, at least among states in the
same geographic region. The Virginia statute is typical:
Cruelty to animals a misdemeanor.-Any person who (1) overrides,
overdrives, overloads, tortures, ill-treats, abandons, willfully inflicts
inhumane injury or pain . . . to, or cruelly or unnecessarily beats,
maims mutilates, or kills any animal, whether belonging to himself
or another, or deprives any animal of necessary sustenance food, or
drink, or causes any of the above things, or being the owner of such
animal permits such acts to be done by another, or (2) willfully sets
on foot, instigates, engages in, or in any way furthers any act of
cruelty to any animal . . . so as to produce torture or unnecessary
suffering, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor .... 1
The broad language of these statutes has led to challenges on the
ground that the statutes are unconstitutionally vague. These chal-
lenges have generally been rejected by the courts, 4 but the broad
language may present some problems for prosecutors in drawing up
indictments, where more specific language than that provided in the
statute may be required. 5
In addition, the generality of the terms used may lead to vehe-
ment argument over what sort of conduct does, in fact, constitute
"cruelty" or "torture." In the case quoted at the beginning of this
section, the Wisconsin court upheld the conviction of the parties
who dragged the unfortunate dog to death; similarly, courts have,
under generally-worded statutes of the type under discussion, found
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-216 (Cum. Supp. 1973). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-360
(Repl. Vol. 1969) ("If any person shall willfully overdrive, overload, wound, injure, torture,
torment, deprive of necessary sustenance .. "); W.VA. CODEANN. § 61-8-19 (1966) ("...
beat, torture, torment, mutilate, kill, or overload, overdrive, or willfully deprive of necessary
sustenance . . ").
14. See, e.g., King v. Staie, 75 Okla. Crim. 210, 130 P.2d 105 (1942). See also Annot., 144
A.L.R. 1037 (1943).
15. State v. Gould, 26 W. Va. 258 (1885).
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that "cruelty" includes beating, 6 burning, 7 castrating,' shooting, 9
pouring acid on hooves,21 overworking,"' and starving,2 2 although in
some of the statutes one or more of these acts, e.g., starving, may
be specifically prohibited without reliance on a general term such
as "cruelty." Freeing a captive fox in the presence of a pack of
hounds and allowing the hounds to tear the fox apart was held to
be cruelty in a Massachusetts case,2 3 and other "sporting" pastimes
involving multilation and death of animals have been condemned
by the courts. 2
Unfortunately, the coverage of these general statutes has often
been drastically narrowed by the creation of exceptions through the
wording of the statute itself. Of particular interest to residents of the
Commonwealth of Virginia is that portion of the Virginia anti-
cruelty statute which specifically exempts the dehorning of cattle
from coverage under the law.25 In an 1892 case, -'2 an Ohio court
described this process in detail, relating how the heads of the cattle
were gripped in a vise while men armed with meat saws and butcher
knives spent eight to ten minutes cutting through the horns and
paring away living flesh while the animal writhed and bellowed in
torment. The Ohio court found the practice to be "cruelty." Appar-
ently, the Virginia General Assembly regarded the practice as
"cruel" also, for it took the trouble to specify that this activity
would not be an offense.
It is likewise interesting to note that not only was the fighting of
animals (e.g., cockfighting, bear-baiting) not a crime at conimon
law, but, in addition, modern courts have sometimes refused to
characterize fighting as "cruelty" or to find that it is prohibited by
16. State v. Allison, 90 N.C. 734 (1884) (defendant beat cow).
17. State v. Bruner, supra note 9 (defendants poured turpentine on a live goose and set it
afire).
18. State v. Hatton, 240 Mo. App. 1244, 228 S.W.2d 10 (1950) (two dogs).
19. Haines v. State, 82 Ga. App. 129, 60 S.E.2d 504 (1950) (hog).
20. Commonwealth v. Brown, 66 Pa. Super. 519 (1917), cited in Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 794
(1962) (horses).
21. State v. Browning, 70 S.C. 466, 50 S.E. 185 (1905) (hiring out unfit mules).
22. State v. Douglas, 78 R.I. 60, 78 A.2d 850 (1951).
23. Commonwealth v. Turner, 145 Mass. 296, 14 N.E. 130 (1887).
24. For an excellent discussion of this entire problem see Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 794, 818
(1962).
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-216 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
26. State v. Critchton, 4 Ohio Dec. 481 (1892), cited in Annot., 82 A.L.R. 2d 794,840 (1962).
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general anti-cruelty laws. In a leading case, the New Mexico court
in 1958 held that cockfighting was not within the state statute mak-
ing it a crime to torture or torment an animal, saying:
Certainly from early times, cockfighting has been considered a lawful
and honorable sport in New Mexico.2
In affirming that this "honorable sport" was not a crime, the
majority observed that "only one American decision has been found
which has held that cockfighting was an unlawful activity, absent
a statute specifically prohibiting it." (Emphasis added).2 The
statement appears to be accurate even if the sentiment is not admi-
rable. The deliberate goading of animals into bloody combat to the
death for the amusement of humans has not, absent a specific stat-
ute, been generally considered to be "cruel." A recent Pennsylvania
case 29 suggests that bullfighting would be considered "cruelty" even
under a general statute, and one suspects that in those few jurisdic-
tions which lack a specific fighting statute, or in instances which are
not covered by the specific statute, the trend today may be against
the reasoning of the New Mexico decision cited above.3 1
It should also be noted that, both at common law and under most
of the statutes, the mere killing of an animal, without more, is not
"cruelty." Before the killing of an animal can support a conviction
under a cruelty statute, it must be found that the killing was done
in a cruel manner.3 1
27. State v. Buford, 65 N.M. 51, 57, 331 P.2d 1110, 1114 (1958). The statute involved was
N.M.S.A. § 40-4-3 (1953), a law of the same general language as those cited in conjunction
with note 13 supra.
28. See note 27 supra. The single exception referred to was Commonwealth v. Tilton, 49
Mass. (8 Met.) 232 (1844).
29. Pennsylvania S.P.C.A. v. Bravo Enterprises, Inc., 428 Pa. 350, 237 A.2d 342 (1968). The
case involved a statute which contained a specific provision against fighting. The dissenting
opinion of Justice Musmanno is, as usual, well worth reading.
30. It is doubtful whether even the majority of the members of the New Mexico court in
State v. Buford shared Justice McGhee's view of cockfighting as an "honorable sport." See
the concurring opinion of Shillinglaw, J. which follows in its entirety:
The sole issue presented is whether or not cockfighting comes within the provisions of
§ 40-4-3 N.M.S.A. 1953. Whether cockfighting is to be considered an honorable sport
is a question not necessary for us to decide. I concur in the result. 65 N.M. at 59, 331
P.2d at 1115.
31. Horton v. State, 124 Ala. 80, 27 So. 468 (1900). But a needless or unnecessary killing
may be a crime, however humane. State v. Neal, 120 N.C. 613, 27 S.E. 81 (1897).
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The concept of "necessity" is very important in the field of anti-
cruelty laws. Under certain circumstances, cruelty, and even tor-
ture, are not "cruelty" in the legal sense because the activity is
"necessary" or "useful." It is, for example, not a crime to boil a
lobster alive because, regardless of the pain inflicted, it is generally
conceded that the "only" way to cook a lobster properly is to boil it
alive.32 Similarly, animal experimentation and, to some extent,
slaughterhouse operations have, until very recently, commonly es-
caped from the operation of anti-cruelty statutes, on the grounds
that these functions are "necessary" and their attendant cruelties
therefore tolerable.33
C. Statutes Covering Specific Acts of Cruelty
In view of the difficulties so frequently encountered in the inter-
pretation of general anti-cruelty statutes, it is not surprising that
most states have covered the more glaring loopholes with additional
statutes which prohibit, expressly and specifically, certain types of
cruel acts. The specific acts prohibited vary from state to state, but
a sampling of jurisdictions in the Middle Atlantic region reveals a
number of prohibitions common to most states. Virginia, for exam-
ple, specifically prohibits fighting,3' poisoning,' maiming36 or "hard
use" 3 of animals; soring of horses;38 shooting of homing pigeons;4"
sexual abuse of animals;4" burning of stables or barns occupied by
livestock;42 or the leaving of injured animals lying in roads.4 3 Poison-
32. See People ex rel. Freel v. Downs, 26 N.Y. Crim 327, 333, 136 N.Y.S. 440, 445 (1911).
33. Animal experimentation, slaughterhouses, and other legal justifications for cruelty are
discussed in detail infra.
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-242 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-159 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
36. Id.
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-161 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-216.1 (Cum. Supp. 1973). "Soring" is a process by which a horse
is subjected to physical pain to induce the animal to assume a particular gait. The legs,
ankles, or feet of the horse are blistered with chemicals, burned, cut, etc., to force the horse
into an unnatural pattern of locomotion deemed fashionable by horse "lovers." Many a
Tennessee Walking Horse has been trained by this method, and the practice, despite the
statutes, is still widespread.
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-246 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-160 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-212 (Cum. Supp. 1973). It is at least arguable that statutes of
this nature are primarily concerned with sexual mores and only incidentally with cruelty to
animals. It is included here because of its possible usefulness as an anti-cruelty measure.
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-76 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 32-70.1 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
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ing, maiming, arson of barn or stable, and sexual abuse or animals
are felonies; the remainder are misdemeanors.
Maryland prohibits abandoning animals;"4 dyeing baby chicks,
ducks, etc. for sale; 45 injuring race horses;4 killing homing pigeons; 4
poisoning;48 or sexual abuse of animals." North Carolina prohibits,
inter alia, shooting homing pigeons" and "bearbaiting, cockfighting
and similar amusements." 51 West Virginia supplements its general
anti-cruelty statute by separately prohibiting, inter alia, keeping
live birds to be shot for amusement. 12 Prohibitions against abandon-
ing, cockfighting, dogfighting, bearbaiting, etc., are expressly in-
cluded in the general statute.0
D. Regulation of Slaughterhouses
In addition to the specific and relatively narrow prohibitions dis-
cussed immediately above, there are several broader areas in which
state statutes have become significant.
One of the most important of these is the problem of the treat-
ment of animals in slaughterhouses and stockyards. The slaughter-
ing of animals for meat has historically been ignored by anti-cruelty
groups and anti-cruelty laws, probably because of the doctrine,
hitherto mentioned in connection with lobsters, which excuses any
amount of agony if the sufferer is good to eat. Through public igno-
rance or public unwillingness to interfere with the timely arrival of
dinner, the animal which passes into the slaughterhouse has tradi-
tionally been lost to view, both literally and legally. That the activi-
ties of meat slaughterers need scrutiny is amply illustrated by an
opinion in an old New York case, 4 which describes vividly the pro-
cess by which hogs being prepared for slaughter were bound by iron
44. MD. ANN. CODE art 27, § 60 (Repl. Vol. 1971).
45. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 60A (Repl. Vol. 1971).
46. Mr. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 61 (Repl. Vol. 1971).
47. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 64 (Repl. Vol. 1971).
48. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 69 (Repl. Vol. 1971).
49. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 554 (Repl. Vol. 1971).
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-369 (Repl. Vol. 1969).
51. N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 14-362 (Repl. Vol. 1969).
52. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-20 (1966).
53. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-19 (1966).
54. Davis v. S.P.C.A., 16 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 73 (N.Y. 1874), cited in Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 794
(1962), rejecting the "if it's edible, let it scream" argument as a justification for cruelty.
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
chains fastened to their ankles, hoisted as much as four floors by
means of these chains, stabbed in the throat, and then plunged alive
into boiling water. Practices of this type have led a number of states
to pass statutes calling for humane methods of slaughtering live-
stock. Maryland law, for example, calls for the animal to be "ren-
dered insensible to pain by mechanical, electrical, chemical or other
means that is rapid and effective, before being shackled, hoisted,
thrown, case [cast?] or cut ..
Regrettably, these slaughterhouse regulations tend to be re-
stricted to commercial slaughterers. Persons slaughtering for home
consumption are frequently excluded, although in predominantly
rural states home slaughter may involve a significant number of
animals each year.56
E. Regulation of Transportation of Animals
Another area in which state law is usually inadequate is the trans-
portation of animals. Animals being transported in quantity to mar-
ket are particularly subject to suffering imposed by crowded condi-
tions, inadequate ventilation, lack of food and water, trampling,
exposure to extremes of heat and cold, and miscellaneous other
nightmares.
Few state legislatures have made any attempt to alleviate the
conditions of transportation to market, probably again due to the
economic importance of the activity and the fact that compulsory
humanity in such matters would seriously reduce the profit margin.
A few states have, however, attempted to attack the problem. North
Carolina, for example, specifically prohibits conveyance of any ani-
mal in any vehicle in a cruel or inhumane manner. 57
F. Regulation of Hunting and Trapping
In all states, the hunting of wild animals is closely regulated by
55. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 333A(g)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1971), which, however, permits the
slashing of the throats of the live, conscious animals "in accordance with ritual requirements
of the Jewish faith .. " See also the discussion of Federal animal laws infra.
56. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 333A and 333B (Repl. Vol. 1971). The author has
a vivid recollection of a discussion with a farmer in which the farmer recounted the frantic
struggling of hogs being immersed alive in boiling water, a method of home slaughter appar-
ently still common among hog breeders in his state.
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-363 (Repl. Vol. 1969). The Federal involvement in this area is
discussed elsewhere in this article.
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state law and local ordinance. By and large, these laws are directed
toward conservation of wildlife, and the suffering of the quarry is not
a matter of concern." This situation is not illogical, and it is not
likely to change in the near future. Hunting is, by definition and
nature, a cruel pastime. The concept of a humane hunting law is
inherently self-contradictory, and it seems probable that only the
eventual elimination of hunting itself will remedy the cruelties per-
petrated in that particular manner.
Trapping is another area in which cruelty appears at first glance
to be inevitable, and yet certain aspects of this particular activity
make it more amenable to the application of anti-cruelty laws.
Unlike hunting, trapping is basically an economic activity rather
than a sport. Within the state of Virginia, trapping is reported to
represent a three to four million dollar per year industry. 9 The field
is not limited to professionals; in the western part of the state,
farmers and other rural landowners regularly engage in trapping as
a means of supplementing income. Recently, animal protection so-
cieties have been trying to focus public attention on the cruelties
inflicted upon fur-bearing animals by the common use of the clamp-
type, serrated-jaw trap, and it takes little imagination to appreciate
the horrors visited upon small animals caught by one leg, fighting
to escape, dying over periods of a week or more of hunger and thirst,
or, in some cases chewing off the trapped leg and crawling away to
die elsewhere of infection or loss of blood.
Although trapping does, by nature, involve cruelty, suffering can
be reduced to a minimum by regulation of the type of traps used
and the methods of trapping. To date, at least, state legislatures
have been slow in passing such regulatory legislation. In Virginia,
the sole legislative acknowledgement of the problem appears to be
§ 29-143 of the Code of Virginia, which requires that trappers visit
all traps at least once each day and remove all animals caught
therein. This law, if observed, would at least reduce the total suffer-
ing time of the victims. However, the law is difficult or impossible
to enforce and therefore inadequate in its present form.61
58. See, e.g., Title 29 of the Virginia Code.
59. These figures, and much of the following information, were provided by officials of the
S.P.C.A..
60. Information provided by sources within the state government.
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Other jurisdictions have been similarly unconcerned with the
humanitarian aspects of trapping laws. Like hunting laws, trapping
laws are generally only concerned with conservation or, at best,
protection of domestic animals which might otherwise accidentally
be caught. Presumably there will be little progress in this area un-
less and until the public anger over the inhumane aspects of trap-
ping exceeds the public interest in decorating itself with fur.
G. Animal Experimentation
Anyone who has toured a medical facility where animals are sub-
ject to experimentation is aware of the high price exacted of the
victims. The suffering of the animals which are cut, burned,
roasted, frozen, injected, starved, poisoned, and otherwise maimed
and murdered in the name of "science," "research," "progress,"
"medicine," or, most ludicrous of all, "humanity," is, unfortun-
ately, completely beyond the knowledge (or at least the comprehen-
sion) of the average citizen. Nevertheless experimentation upon ani-
mals, and the breeding, shipping and sale of these unlucky creatures
is a widespread and extremely profitable enterprise.
Absent statute, experimentation with animals is, of course, not an
offense under the common law view of animals as property. Even
in the presence of a general anti-cruelty statute, animal experimen-
tation has been generally ignored, or, if considered, excused on the
grounds that it is "necessary" for the greater good of humanity."'
Although occasionally a statute is found which purports to regulate
breeders of laboratory animals, 2 state legislatures, prompted either
by the "necessity" argument or the pressure applied by lobbyists
acting on behalf of experimental animal breeders, have generally
failed or declined to pass statutes specifically governing the treat-
ment of laboratory animals. Some states have, in fact, gone a step
in the other direction and have expressly exempted medical re-
search animals from the operation of the state's general anti-cruelty
laws. This express exemption is, of course, a legislative recognition
of the fact that such experimentation is in fact cruel, and therefore,
absent specific exemption, unlawful.13
61. See, e.g., New Jersey S.P.C.A. v. Board of Educ., 91 N.J. Super. 81, 219 A.2d 200 (1966)
aff'd, 49 N.J. 15, 227 A.2d 506 (1967).
62. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-29.1 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
63. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-216 (Cum. Supp. 1972): "Any person who.., inflicts
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Since animal experimentation appears to be an essential feature
of medical research, and therefore a necessary evil, it seems fitting
that efforts be made to restrict the suffering involved to an irreduci-
ble minimum. To accomplish this, strong legislative control is
needed. Unfortunately, this particular area is a virtual void as far
as state laws are concerned, and the result has been an unham-
pered free-wheeling trade in animals destined for laboratory execu-
tion." Federal enactments, alone, brighten this particular legisla-
tive wasteland.
II. FEDERAL LAWS
In view of the relative indifference of state lawmakers to the prob-
lems discussed above, it is not surprising to find the federal govern-
ment filling a portion of the void. This Congressional interest, pri-
marily manifested during the last few years, has produced several
pieces of legislation which supplement or pre-empt the various
muddled, weak, and fragmentary state laws.
Federal legislation has been particularly concerned with the
transportation of animals. As early as 1906, Congress has passed an
act designed to reduce the suffering of animals being transported in
interstate commerce.15 This act, now designated 45 U.S.C. § 71 et
seq., (1970), regulates railroads, express companies, car companies,
common carriers, owners or masters of vessels, or receivers, trustees
or lessees of any of the foregoing who transport "cattle, sheep, swine,
or other animals." The act calls for limitations on the time periods
that animals can be confined and requires periodic unloading for
rest, water and feed. Civil and criminal penalties are provided."
The disgusting conditions existing in the nation's slaughterhouses
became the subject of Congressional attention in 1960. The Federal
inhumane injury or pain not connected with bona fide scientific or medical
experimentation. . . ." (Emphasis added). See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 67A (Repl.
Vol. 1971). At least one court has ruled that impounded stray animals can be turned over to
research facilities for use in medical experiments, on the grounds that the police power of the
state includes "preventing waste of resources." Massachusetts S.P.C.A. v. Commissioner of
Pub. Health, 339 Mass. 216, 158 N.E.2d 487 (1959).
64. This carte blanche has, among other things, led to a healthy traffic in stolen pets.
Although larceny of an animal is, of course, now generally prohibited by statute, prosecutions
of persons engaged in dog-napping for laboratories have been rare.
65. Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3594, § 1 et seq., 34 Stat. 607.
66. 45 U.S.C. §§ 73-74 (1970).
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Humane Slaughter Law,67 which called for rapid, effective dispatch
of the animals prior to shackling, hoisting, etc., and the use of
humane methods, has served as a model for similar laws in several
states.68
The Horse Protection Act of 1970,9 prohibits the shipment in
interstate commerce, for showing or exhibition, of a horse which has
been sored.70 The act likewise prohibits the showing or exhibition of
a sored horse in any exhibition in which any horse has been moved
in interstate commerce, and the holding of any exhibition in which
a sored horse is exhibited if any horse in the show has been moved
in interstate commerce.
A. Federal Regulation of Animal Experimentation
One area in which the Federal effort has been particularly note-
worthy is the field of animal experimentation. In 1966 the Congress
of the United States, acting to remedy the inadequacy of state laws
in this area, passed the Federal Laboratory Animal Welfare Act.7'
This Act, together with supplemental legislation enacted in 1970,72
is designed to:
[Pirotect the owners of animals, from the theft of their animals, to
prevent the sale or use of animals which have been stolen, and to
insure that certain animals intended for use in research facilities are
provided humane care and treatment. .... 13
To this laudable end, the act attempts to regulate:
[T]he transportation, purchase, sale, housing, care, handling, and
treatment of such animals by persons or organizations engaged in
using them for research or experimental purposes . . . or in trans-
porting, buying, or selling them for any such purpose or use.74
67. 7 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (1970).
68. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 333 (Repl. Vol. 1971).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1821 et seq. (1970).
70. See note 38 supra.
71. 7 U.S.C. § 2131 et seq. (1970).
72. The Animal Welfare Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579, §§ 1-25, 34 Stat. 1560.
73. 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (1970). The 1970 amendment extended coverage of the act to include
animals destined for exhibitions or use as pets.
74. Id.
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The act calls for the registration of research facilities utilizing
animals and for the licensing of dealers who supply the animals. It
prohibits facilities from dealing with unlicensed dealers. Animals
must be identified before being sold or transported, and humane
treatment is required, under standards to be set up by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture for housing, feeding, watering, sanitation, ven-
tilation, shelter, and veterinary care. 75 Provision is made for inspec-
tion and investigation by the Department of Agriculture,76 and pen-
alties for violations are prescribed.
The 1966 act specifically exempted actual experimentation proce-
dures from the coverage of the act.77 The 1970 amendments, how-
ever, corrected this glaring omission at least in part by requiring
that the Department of Agriculture standards shall include "the
appropriate use of anesthetic, analgesic, or tranquilizing drugs,
when such use would be proper" and providing that:
The Secretary shall require, at least annually, every research facility
to show that professionally acceptable standards governing the care,
treatment, and use of animals, including appropriate use of anesthe-
tic, analgesic, and tranquilizing drugs, during experimentation are
being followed .... 78
These acts are clearly a step in the right direction, although the
problem of enforcement is, as always, a major difficulty. It is re-
grettable that the various states have not seen fit to enact similar
legislation.
Il1. ENFORCEMENT OF ANIMAL CRUELTY LAWS
As depressing as the legislative situation appears to be, the en-
forcement aspect of animal cruelty laws presents an even darker
picture. The fact is that the few existing laws are generally very
poorly enforced. This regrettable reality is the result of several fac-
tors; the fragmentary nature of the laws and the frequently vague
language employed; the lack of funds and personnel for the agencies
charged with enforcement; and the indifference toward animal cru-
75. See 9 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1971) et seq. for the standards set up by the Department of Agricul-
ture under the mandate of Act of August 24, 1966, Pub. L. No. 91-579, §§ 1-24, 80 Stat. 350.
76. 7 U.S.C. § 2146 (1970).
77. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2143, 2148 (1970).
78. 7 U.S.C. § 2143, as amended in 1970. § 2148 was repealed in 1970.
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elty shared by the public at large, law enforcement officials, and
public prosecutors.
In Virginia, the official state agency which would probably be best
qualified to administer animal cruelty laws has been virtually
barred from the field by operation of statute. An examination of
Virginia's code sections applicable to the control of animals reveals
frequent reference to game wardens as the officials responsible for
their enforcement.79 Still another section of the Virginia code, how-
ever, provides that when the locality appoints a dog warden, the
game warden shall have no further jurisdiction." But all cities and
counties of the state have now appointed dog wardens,' and this
circumstance, coupled with the previously-mentioned fact that the
game laws themselves deal primarily with conservation and not
cruelty, has in effect relieved the Commission of Game and Inland
Fisheries and its personnel of any responsibility in the area of hu-
mane law enforcement, particularly where domestic animals are
concerned.
The dog wardens appointed by the various localities are, by stat-
ute, concerned primarily with animal control and not animal pro-
tection. Consequently, they are seldom, if ever, involved in the pros-
ecution of cruelty cases, and, in some instances, may themselves be
forced by circumstance and the nature of their duties to inflict
considerable suffering on the animals with which they deal. 2
Police and sheriffs' departments are, of course, primarily charged
with the enforcement of the anti-cruelty statutes which are criminal
laws. Unfortunately, the typical department is so overburdened
with the escalating propensity of the American citizen to engage in
79. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 29-199 (Cum. Supp. 1973) (concerning the killing of unli-
censed dogs).
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-184.2 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
81. There appears to be one technical exception to this. One western Virginia county has
reportedly not "officially" appointed a dog warden but is nonetheless enforcing dog laws to
the exclusion of the game wardens.
82. The responsibilities of local wardens, which are primarily the capture, imprisonment,
and killing of dogs and other small animals, may be attended by a substantial amount of
suffering on the part of the animals involved. Slow and inefficient methods of killing are a
particular concern here, for local officers frequently lack the facilities and training necessary
to the humane destruction of stray or unwanted animals. This deficiency is often a matter of
great dissatisfaction to the wardens themselves, who would generally prefer to carry out their
required tasks with a minimum of discomfort to the animals.
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criminal activity, that animal mistreatment is of necessity given low
priority. Police officers, therefore, seldom, if ever, initiate cruelty
prosecutions, although they will act on warrants sworn out by oth-
ers. In effect, then, there is very little official enforcement of the
anti-cruelty laws. As a result, the burden of combating the human
tendency to be sadistic toward lesser creatures falls primarily upon
private citizens and the various private animal humane societies.
State codes frequently give the local S.P.C.A. and similar organi-
zations quasi-official enforcement powers. In Virginia, for example,
any officer or agent of "any society duly incorporated under the laws
of this State for the prevention of cruelty to animals" is given the
power "to arrest, without warrant, any person found violating in his
presence any of the provisions of law concerning cruelty to ani-
mals. . . ... Such agencies regularly engage in the investigation of
complaints concerning cruelty to animals, assist in the prosecution
of such complaints where appropriate, provide shelters for stray and
unwanted animals, attempt to find homes for such animals, and
educate responsible state and local officials and the public at large
in the proper treatment and disposition of animals."
The primary obstacle encountered by such private agencies is a
lack of money. Most agencies of this type are privately funded by
contributions from the public and are manned at least in part by
unpaid volunteers. A few states have been perceptive enough to
provide for private humane societies to receive some public funds,
usually from dog license fees or fines collected for animal law viola-
tions, 5 but the majority of states give no public financial support
to animal societies.8 6
In short, it may be fairly said that state governments have taken
little interest in enforcing animal welfare laws. What enforcement
there is has been left almost entirely in the hands of private agencies
and individual citizens courageous enough to swear out a warrant.
This official indifference has, in general, rendered the meagre pro-
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-217 (RepI. Vol. 1960).
84. Information provided by officials of the S.P.C.A. and the Virginia Federation of Hu-
mane Societies, Inc.. It should be noted that some local governments (for example, Rich-
mond) also operate animals shelters where animals are held pending possible adoption.
85. For a brief judicial discussion of this practice see Nicchia v. People, 254 U.S. 228 (1920).
86. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (Cum. Supp. 1971) (dog license taxes to go to school
fund); VA. CODE ANN. § 29-184.6, -184.8 (Repl. Vol. 1973) (dog license taxes to be paid into
county treasury).
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tection provided by the few existing laws largely illusory, at least on
the state level.87
A. Prosecution of Animal Cruelty Cases
Even in those cases where an investigation is made and a warrant
sworn out, the average state prosecutor's office is in a poor position
to obtain a criminal conviction inder anti-cruelty laws. The loose
language and fragmentary coverage of the laws has already been
discussed. In addition, the prosecutor who would prosecute a
cruelty-to-animals case is faced with serious problems of proof, not
the least of which is the typical reluctance of the average citizen to
testify against a neighbor, regardless of how savagely said neighbor
may have behaved toward some member of the animal kingdom.
Unless a humane society official is the complaining witness, the
prosecutor may simply be unable to establish the offense to the
satisfaction of a court or jury.
On top of the foregoing difficulties, the prosecutor is faced with a
myriad of legal defenses which can be raised by those charged with
cruelty. Some of these have already been discussed, e.g., the theory
that, under certain circumstances, necessity (for example, the need
for food or medical research) justifies at least a certain amount of
suffering which is therefore excused.
Negligent or accidental infliction of suffering is usually not ac-
tionable. Thus, injuring or killing a dog by negligently driving an
automobile over it is not an offense within the anti-cruelty statute.8
Even where the act or omission is voluntray and deliberate, it
usually must be shown that the defendant was aware that the ani-
mal was suffering thereby. If the defendant was truly ignorant of the
distress of the animal, there is no punishable act. 9
It is sometimes said that it is not necessary to prove intent to
cause pain, and that it is sufficient if the prosecution shows that the
87. The Department of Agriculture, which has an established inspection division, is better
able to cope with its obligations under the various Federal humane laws. However, the
Department still faces the same problems of lack of adequate funds and personnel to police
the regulations thoroughly.
88. Territory v. Shindo, 32 Hawaii 76 (1931); Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 794 (1962).
89. Re Stage Horse Cases, 15 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 51 (N.Y. 1873); Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 794
(1962).
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defendant voluntarily committed an act which must necessarily
cause pain." But in the case of maiming statutes, specific intent to
maim is usually an element of the offense, and must therefore be
proven.9
Even should intent be proven, the act may be excusable in the
eyes of the law. It is generally recognized that, in addition to the
need to obtain food or the need for medical experimentation, there
are certain other situations in which the infliction of discomfort
may, as a practical matter, be "necessary." Thus, for example, it
may be "necessary" to inflict pain to discipline an animal, or even
to train it.92 Discipline and training being proper and lawful ends,
cruelty which can be categorized as either of these will usually be
excused.13
Although it more often arises in prosecutions for killing an animal
than in cruelty cases, it does appear logical that defense against
attack should be a legal justification for harsh action against ani-
mals in some instances. Thus, defense of one's self 4 or of other
persons95 would appear to excuse at least some degree of assault
upon the offending animal, and there are a multitude of statutes
and cases which justify shooting or killing animals, especially dogs,
which are attacking the defendant's livestock.9 These various defen-
ses provide ample ammunition for the defendant, for they can be
stretched to cover many sins, and a clever defense counsel will use
them to the utmost.
Still another stumbling block in the prosecutor's path is the tend-
ency of at least a certain percentage of the judiciary to regard anti-
cruelty laws and prosecutions as nonsense. Particularly in rural
areas, where hunting, trapping, and home slaughtering are so com-
mon as to be a way of life, there is frequently a lack of sympathy
90. Commonwealth v. Lufkin, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 579 (1863).
91. Winckler v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1146, 156 S.E.364 (1931) (no presumption attack
was with intent to maim or kill); State v. Fletcher, 106 W.Va. 601, 146 S.E. 628 (1929) (must
prove "malice").
92. But see note 38 supra.
93. Where, however, the defense is necessity, the defendant must bear the burden of
proving the necessity. Breedlove v. Hardy, 132 Va. 11, 110 S.E. 358 (1922).
94. For a good discussion of this entire subject and a comprehensive collection of cases see
Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 578 (1951).
95. See Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 770 (1960).
96. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-14 (Repl. Vol. 1965); VA. CODE ANN. § 29-197 (Cum.
Supp. 1973); Willeroy v: Commonwealth, 181 Va. 799, 27 S.E.2d 211 (1943).
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on the part of the man(or woman) on the bench. Thus, for example,
the impatience with the whole matter which led one jurist to
observe that:
Society could not long tolerate a system of laws which might drag to
the criminal bar every lady who might impale a butterfly, or every
man who might drown a litter Qf kittens."
With these and other obstacles thrown into the way of cruelty
prosecutions, it is hardly surprising that prosecutors are generally
lukewarm toward the prospect of trying a cruelty-to-animals case.
There is a tendency either to avoid prosecution entirely, or, at best,
to assign to the case the most junior assistant in the prosecutor's
office. Needless to say, the conviction record in cruelty cases is
therefore somewhat less than satisfactory."
IV. PLANS AND PROPOSALS
In view of the fact that man has been mistreating animals since
the dawn of history, despite all religious, social, and legal pressure
to prevent it, it hardly seems likely that many of us will live to see
a new era in which man will be unfailingly benevolent to the "infe-
rior" species. On the theory, however, that it is better to light one
candle than to curse the darkness, some things can be done and are
being done in an attempt to mitigate the situation.
A. Improvement of Laws
First, it is obvious that better laws are needed. Legislatures must
somehow be persuaded to take cognizance of the abuses discussed
above and to pass tighter, more comprehensive laws. Loopholes
must be plugged. Special interest groups (e.g., furriers, meat pack-
ers, cattle breeders, and research animal dealers) must no longer be
permitted to stifle remedial legislation. Courts must be presented
with legislative mandates which permit no evasion by callous or
disinterested judges of the "cockfighting is an honorable sport" vari-
ety.
This struggle for better legislation has long been waged by animal
97. State v. Buford, 65 N.M. 51, 59, 331 P.2d 1110, 1115 (1958), citing Grise v. State, 37
Ark. 456 (1881).
98. Civil actions for damages are, of course, possible. Unless the animal (a) belongs to
someone and (b) is killed or crippled, such actions are rare.
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welfare societies. For example, the Virginia Federation of Humane
Societies, Inc., in conjunction with the United States Animal
Health Association, has produced a proposed model act and is cur-
rently working for its passage in Virginia." This model legislation,
if passed, would fill several of the gaps which presently exist in the
Virginia animal laws. Unfortunately, there is usually no established
legislative committee or other formal liaison group through which
humane societies can deal directly with state legislatures. Unless an
individual legislator takes an interest in animal welfare, the animal
welfare societies have no means of introducing animal welfare legis-
lation. The only means of obtaining such legislation is pressure by
informed and aroused constituents upon their individual represent-
atives. Coordinated public campaigns to force legislative attention
to this area are needed, but the cost is high and the level of public
indifference is appalling.
B. Improvement of Law Enforcement
A second, and perhaps more fruitful, prospect is improvement of
the enforcement of the laws which are already on the books. Animal
wardens appointed by the various localities should be more numer-
ous, better trained, and better paid. ' Wardens, policemen, and
sheriff's deputies, should be empowered by law and required by
their superiors to investigate and prosecute animal cruelty cases.
The public and the press should put increasing pressure on local
administrators and prosecutors to force them to pay proper atten-
tion to the reporting, investigation, and prosecution of cruelty cases,
regardless of political expediency. The laws we already have would
be vastly more effective if they were enforced.
C. Improvement of Public Facilities
Public animal impoundment facilities are frequently a public dis-
grace. They are invariably too small, often poorly maintained, and
usually miserably equipped. Dog wardens frequently are forced to
99. See appendix.
100. The animal wardens should be; more numerous, so that they will be able to handle
an added burden of humane law enforcement, instead of being merely "dog-catchers;" better
trained, because improper handling of animals, especially inept use of euthanasia devices,
can cause immeasurable suffering; better paid to make certain that well-educated, highly-
motivated personnel of a professional caliber are attracted to the job, and to insure that they
stay in the job for resaonable periods of time.
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dispose of animals by shooting or by carbon monoxide poisoning,
due to the lack of modern euthanasia equipment."' These condi-
tions should be remedied by the construction of modem pounds of
adequate dimensions. Humane animal disposal equipment should
be required and proper maintenance of all facilities should be en-
sured by frequent state inspection.
D. Expansion of Private Humane Society Services
Until that presumably far-off day when state governments are
prepared to begin fulfilling their obligations in the field of animal
welfare, it will continue to be the private humane societies which
carry the burden of protecting and caring for abused and unwanted
animals. Although it is unfortunate that states are permitted to
side-step their responsibilities in this area, it is undeniable that the
private societies do an excellent job, particularly when one considers
their limited resources. Continued popular support for their efforts
is essential, for, at present, they are the only effective force in this
entire field. Expansion of their facilities, increases in their person-
nel, and public recognition and support of their efforts will insure,
on the whole, the best possible progress in the field of animal welfare
for the forseeable future. The key to this is, of course, an improved
financial structure.
E. Financial Assistance for Animal Welfare Agencies
The majority of states collect vast sums of revenue from dog licen-
ses and a reasonable amount of revenue from animal law fines each
year. In most jurisdictions this money continues to be diverted to
purposes completely unrelated to animal control, animal conserva-
tion, or animal welfare. At least some percentage of these funds
should be channeled back into public agencies and facilities charged
with responsibility for animal control and conservation. Since in
most jurisdictions no public agency assumes any responsibility for
the enforcement of humane laws and the care of unwanted animals,
it seems only fitting that some portion of the funds be placed at the
disposal of the S.P.C.A. or other private humane societies.
101. It has been reliably reported to the author that one of central Virginia's most populous
and well-to-do counties did not, until very recently, have any sort of euthanasia equipment.
The wardens were disposing of impounded animals by shutting them up in an old truck and
asphyxiating the animals with the exhaust gases.
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Some private agencies would no doubt regard this move with
suspicion, fearing the bureaucratic interference which usually ac-
companies a grant of public money. Certainly, care should be taken
that the funds are made available to the private agencies with a
minimum of state intermeddling and red tape. If, however, this
could be accomplished successfully, the benefits would be enormous
and immediate. If direct grants are not feasible, then the state res-
ponsibilities in this area could and should be delegated to existing
private societies on a formal contract basis, with the state paying
all or at least a large part of the cost of expanded private services.
10 2
Unless and until something of this nature is arranged, progress will
continue to be slow and painful-especially to the animals.
V. CONCLUSION
If the reader has drawn from these pages the conclusion that the
field of animal protection law is in a sorry state, the reader is
precisely correct. In an age which prides itself on technology, en-
lightenment, education, good will, and justice, we still treat the
majority of the earth's living creatures in a manner which is, in most
respects, worthy of a medieval torturers' guild. That we continue to
tolerate inhumanities of the type discussed in this article is an in-
dictment of us all, and one which should weigh heavily on each and
every human conscience.
To disregard the rights and feelings of equals, is unjust and ungener-
ous, but to willfully or wantonly injure or oppress the weak and help-
less, is mean and cowardly. Human beings have at least some means
of protecting themselves against the inhumanity of man . . . but
dumb brutes have none. . .Animals whose lives are devoted to our
use and pleasure, and which are capable perhaps, of feeling as great
physical pain or pleasnre [sic] as ourselves, deserve, for these con-
siderations alone, kindly treatment. The dominion of man over them,
if not a moral trust has a better significance than the development
of malignant passions and cruel instincts. Often their beauty, gentle-
ness, and fidelity suggest the reflection that it may have been one of
102. Proposals for public funding of animal protection efforts are often greeted with jeers
from those who have no interest in animals. The usual comment is "why should my tax money
go for that? Let the bow-wows (animal lovers) pay for it." -It should be noted that (1) the
proposal stated herein involves only funds from animal licenses and fines and (2) the "bow-
wows" are already supporting the private agencies through contributions and adoption fees.
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the purposes of their creation and subordination to enlarge the sym-
pathies and expand the better feelings of our race. But, however this
may be, human beings should be kind and just to dumb brutes; if for
no other reason than to learn how to be kind and just to each other."3
103. Stephens v. State, 65 Miss. 329, 331-32, 3 So. 458, 459 (1887).
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APPENDIX
DRAFT OF A PROPOSED MODEL STATE LAW
Title: A proposed Model Law designed to supplement the Federal
Laboratory Animal Welfare Act (P.L. 89-544), as amended by the
Animal Welfare Act of 1970, (P.L. 91-579), to provide standards for
the care of animals in animal shelters, pounds, and pet shops, and
to regulate dealers and dog wardens.
Section 1. Purpose: (1) To protect the owners of dogs and cats from
the theft of such pets; (2) to prevent the sale or use of stolen pets;
(3) to insure that all warm-blooded vertebrate animals, as items of
commerce are provided humane care and treatment by regulating
the transportation, sale, puchase, housing, care, handling and treat-
ment of such animals by persons or organizations engaged in trans-
porting, buying or selling them for such use; (4) to insure that ani-
mals confined in pet shops, kennels, animal shelters, auction mar-
kets and pounds are provided humane care and treatment; (5) to
release for sale, trade or adoption only those animals which appear
to be free of infection, communicable disease, or abnormalities, un-
less veterinary care subsequent to release is assured.
Section 2. Definitions: as used in this article and the regulations
promulgated thereunder, the following terms shall be construed,
respectively, to mean:
(a) "Pound" or "dog pound" means a facility operated by a state,
or any political subdivision thereof, for the purpose of impounding
or harboring seized, stray, homeless, abandoned or unwanted dogs,
cats, and other animals; or a facility operated for such purpose
under a contract with any municipal corporation or incorporated
society for the prevention of cruelty to animals.
(b) "Person" means any individual, partnership, firm, joint stock
company, corporation association, trust, estate, or other legal en-
tity.
(c) "Animal Shelter" means a facility which is used to house or
contain animals and which is owned, operated, or maintained by a
duly incorporated humane society, animal welfare society, society
for the prevention of cruelty to animals, or other non-profit organi-
zation devoted to the welfare, protection and humane treatment of
animals.
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(d) "Pet Shop" means a business establishment where animals are
bought, sold, exchanged, or offered for sale or exchange to the gen-
eral public at retail or wholesale.
(e) "Kennel" means a place or establishment other than a pound
or animal shelter where animals not owned by the proprietor are
sheltered, fed and watered in return for a fee.
(f) "Animal" means any dog or cat, rabbit, rodent, nonhuman
primate, bird or other warm-blooded vertebrate but shall not in-
clude horses, cattle, sheep, goats, swine and domestic fowl.
(g) "Public Auction" means any place or location where dogs or
cats are sold at auction to the highest bidder regardless of whether
such dogs or cats are offered as individuals, as a group, or by weight.
(h) "Commissioner" means the Commissioner of Agriculture of
the State of
(i) "Dealer" means any person who sells, exchanges, or donates,
or offers to sell, exchange, or donate animals to another dealer, pet
shop, or research facility, for research or teaching purposes or for
exhibition purposes or for use as pets, but such term excludes any
retail pet shop which breeds or raises animals on its own premises,
or any individual who breeds or raises animals on his own premises,
unless such animals so bred and raised are sold specifically for re-
search or teaching purposes, or to a dealer.
(j) "Research facility" means any place, laboratory or institution
at which scientific tests, experiments, or investigations involving
the use of living animals are carried out, conducted, or attempted.
(k) "Primary enclosure" means any structure used to immediately
restrict an animal or animals to a limited amount of space, such as
a room, pen, cage, compartment or hutch.
(1) "Housing facility" means any room, building, or area used to
contain a primary enclosure or enclosures.
(m) "Sanitize" means to make physically clean and to remove and
destroy to a practical minimum, agents injurious to health.
(n) "Euthanasia" means the humane destruction of an animal
accomplished by a method that involves instantaneous uncon-
sciousness and immediate death or by a method that involves anes-
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thesia, produced by an agent which causes painless loss of con-
sciousness, and death during such loss of consciousness.
(o) "Ambient temperature" means the temperature surrounding
the animal.
(p) "Adequate feed" means the provision at suitable inter-
vals-not to exceed 12 hours-of a quantity of wholesome foodstuff
suitable for the species and age, sufficient to maintain a reasonable
level of nutrition in each animal. Such foodstuff shall be served in
a sanitized receptacle, dish, or container.
(q) "Adequate water" means a constant access to a supply of
clean, fresh, potable water provided in a sanitary manner.
(r) "Dog Warden" means any person employed, contracted or ap-
pointed by the state or any political subdivision thereof for the
purpose of aiding in the enforcement of this law or any other law or
ordinance relating to the licensing of dogs, control of dogs, or seizure
and impoundment of dogs and includes any state or municipal
peace officer, animal control officer, sheriff, constable or other em-
ployee whose duties in whole or in part include assignments which
involve the seizure or taking into custody of any dog.
Section 3. No municipality shall operate a dog pound for more
than six months subsequent to the effective date of this article
unless a certificate of registration for such dog pound has been
granted by the commissioner. Application for such certificate shall
be made in the manner provided by the commissioner. No fee shall
be required for such application or certificate. Certificates of Regis-
tration shall be valid for a period of - years or until revoked
and may be renewed for like periods upon application in the manner
provided.
Section 4. No person shall operate an animal shelter for more than
six months subsequent to the effective date of this article unless a
certificate of registration for such animal shelter has been granted
by the commissioner. Application for such certificate shall be made
in the manner provided by the commissioner. No fee shall be re-
quired for such application or certificate. Certificates of Registra-
tion shall be valid for a period of - years or until revoked and
may be renewed for like periods upon application in the manner
provided.
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Section 5. No person shall operate a pet shop as defined in this
article for more than six months subsequent to the effective date of
this article unless a license to operate such establishment shall have
been granted by the commissioner. Application for such license
shall be made in the manner provided by the commissioner. The
license period shall be the calendar (or fiscal) year and the license
fee shall be $25 (or $50 or $100) for each license period or part thereof
beginning with the first day of the calendar (or fiscal) year.
Section 6. No person shall operate a public auction or a kennel as
defined in this article for more than six months subsequent to the
effective date of this article unless a license to operate such estab-
lishment shall have been granted by the commissioner. Application
for such license shall be made in the manner provided by the com-
missioner. The license period shall be the calendar (or fiscal year)
and the license fee shall be $25 (or $50 or $100) for each license
period or part thereof beginning with the first day of the calendar
(or fiscal) year.
Section 7. No person shall be a dealer as defined in this article
after the first day of the calendar (or fiscal) year unless a license to
deal shall have been granted by the commissioner to such person.
Application for such license shall be made in the manner provided
by the commissioner. The license period shall be the calendar (or
fiscal) year and the license fee shall be $100 (or $200 or $500) for
each license period or part thereof beginning with the first day of
the calendar (or fiscal) year.
Section 8. A certificate of registration may be denied to any pound
or animal shelter and a license may be denied to any public auction,
kennel, pet shop or dealer, or, if granted, such certificate or license
may be revoked by the commissioner if, after public hearing, it is
determined that the housing facilities and/or primary enclosures are
inadequate for the purposes of this article or if the feeding, watering,
sanitizing, housing practices, and humane Euthanasia methods
when required at the pound, animal shelter, public auction, pet
shop or kennel, and if compliance with the rules and regulations
which may be promulgated pursuant to the authority of this article,
are not consistent with the intent of this article or with the intent
of said rules and regulations.
Section 9. Operation of a pet shop, kennel or public auction with-
out a currently valid license shall constitute a misdemeanor subject
[Vol. 8:201
ANIMAL CRUELTY LAWS
to a penalty not less than $ and not more than $.,
-and each day of such operation shall constitute a separate offense.
Section 10. Dealing in animals as defined in this article without a
currently valid license shall constitute a felony subject to a penalty
not less than $. and not more than $ , or confine-
ment for a period not to exceed __ months or both. Continued
illegal operation after conviction shall constitute a separate offense.
Animals found in the possession or custody of an unlicensed dealer
shall be subject to immediate seizure and impoundment, and, upon
conviction of such dealer the court shall order that the animals be
turned over to the nearest animal welfare organization or otherwise
humanely disposed of as deemed proper by the court.
Section 11. Failure of any person licensed or registered to ade-
quately house, feed and water animals in his possession or custody,
or when required, to use humane methods of Euthanasia, shall con-
stitute a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be subject to a fine
of not less than ($2, or $5, or $10) per animal or more than a total
of ($1,000 or $2,000). Such animals shall be subject to seizure and
impoundment and upon conviction of such person the court shall
order that the animals be turned over to the nearest animal welfare
organization or otherwise humanely disposed of as deemed proper
by the court, and such failure shall constitute grounds for revocation
of license or registration after conviction.
Section 12. The governing body of the political subdivision regu-
lating the operation of a pound shall determine that impounded
animals are returned to owners, placed for adoption, or humanely
destroyed. Any proceeds deriving from disposition of such .animals
shall be paid directly to the clerk or treasurer of the political subdi-
vision and no part of such proceeds shall accrue to any individual.
The board of directors of an incorporated humane society shall de-
termine the method of disposition of animals released by its animal
shelter. Any proceeds deriving from such disposition of animals
shall be paid directly to the clerk or treasurer of the humane society
and no part of such proceeds shall accrue to any individual.
No dog warden shall give or sell or negotiate for the gift or sale to
a pet shop dealer, or research facility of any animal which may come
into his custody in the course of carrying out his official assign-
ments. No dog warden shall be granted a dealer's license and each
application for such license shall include a statement made under
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oath, that neither the applicant or any member or employee of the
firm, partnership, or corporation making application is a dog war-
den within the meaning of the definition herein. A dog warden, upon
taking custody of any animal in the course of his official duties, shall
immediately make a record of the matter in the manner prescribed
by the commissioner and the record shall include a description of
the animal including color, breed, sex, approximate weight, reason
for seizure, location of seizure, the owner's name and address if
known and all license or other identification numbers if any. Com-
plete information relating to the disposition of the dog shall be
added in the manner provided by the commissioner immediately
after disposition.
Section 13. Violation of any provision of this article which relates
to the seizing, impoundment and custody of an animal by a dog
warden shall constitute a misdemeanor subject to a fine not less
than $ _ and not more than $ _ , and each animal handled
in violation shall constitute a separate offense.
Section 14. (a) The commissioner shall, promulgate rules and reg-
ulations consistent with the objectives and intent of this article for
the purpose of carrying out such objectives and intent. Such rules
and regulations may include, but are not limited to provisions relat-
ing to humane transportation to and from registered or licensed
premises, records of purchase and sale, identification of animals
handled, primary enclosures, housing facilities, sanitation, euthan-
asia, ambient temperatures, feeding, watering, and adequate veteri-
nary medical care. He may at his discretion, after public hearing,
adopt in whole or in part, those portions of the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of the United States Department of
Agriculture pursuant to the provisions of the United States Public
Law 89-544, as amended by the Laboratory Animal Welfare Act of
1970, P.L. 91-579 which are consistent with the intent and purpose
of this article. (b) Any rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commissioner shall be submitted to interested groups for study and
comment sixty days prior to the effective date. (c) Every rule or
regulation of the Commissioner shall be posted for public inspection
in the main office of the Commissioner and a certified copy filed in
the Office of the Secretary of State. Copies of all rules and regula-
tions of the Commissioner authenticated by the signature of said
Commissioner shall for all purposes be deemed to be certified cop-
ies. A rule or regulation of the Commissioner, when duly posted and
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filed as provided in this Section, shall have the force and effect of
Law. The Commissioner and any officer or agent of any society duly
incorporated under the laws of this State for the prevention of cru-
elty to animals shall enforce the rules and regulations promulgated
by the Commissioner.
Section 15. This article shall not apply to a place or establishment
which is operated under the immediate supervision of a duly li-
censed veterinarian as a hospital where animals are harbored,
boarded and cared for incidental to the treatment, prevention, or
alleviation of disease processes during the routine practice of the
profession of veterinary medicine except that, if animals are ac-
cepted by such place, establishment or hospital for the primary
purpose of boarding in return for a fee, the place, establishment or
hospital shall be subject to the kennel license provisions of this
article and the regulations relating thereto which may hereafter be
promulgated by the commissioner. This article shall not apply to
any dealer or research facility during the period such dealer or re-
search facility is in the possession of a valid license or registration
granted by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the provisions
of United States Public Law 89-544.
Section 16. For the purposes of administering and enforcing this
article and rules and regulations that may hereafter be promulgated
thereunder the sum of $_ is hereby appropriated.
Section 17. A violation of any provision of this chapter or of any
rule or regulation of the Commissioner lawfully made, except as
otherwise expressly provided by this chapter, shall be a misde-
meanor punishable by a fine not exceeding $500 or by imprisonment
not exceeding one year, and each day during which such violation
shall continue shall be deemed a separate violation.
Section 18. If any provision of this article or the application of any
such provision to any person or circumstances shall be held invalid,
the remainder of the article and the application of any such provi-
sion to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is
held invalid shall not be affected thereby.
1974]

